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THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF NON-
CITIZENS
R. GEORGE WRIGHT*
ABSTRACT
However paradoxically, in some practically important contexts, non-citizens of all 
sorts can rightly claim what amount to privileges and immunities of citizens. This 
follows from a careful and entirely plausible understanding of the inherently 
relational, inescapably social, and essentially reciprocal nature of at least some typical 
privileges and immunities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article contends that the relationship between constitutional privileges and 
immunities and citizenship is more nuanced, and much more interesting, than usually 
recognized. Crucially, allowing some non-citizens to invoke the privileges and 
immunities of citizens often makes sense. The intuitive sense that non-citizens cannot 
logically claim the privileges or immunities of citizens rests on a misunderstanding of 
the nature of rights and rights-holders. Practice and logic combine to vindicate what 
would seem to be a paradoxical claim. In some practically important contexts, non-
citizens of all sorts can rightly claim what amounts to privileges and immunities of 
citizens.
Let us begin with the relevant constitutional texts. Article IV reads, in part, that 
“[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens in the several States.”1 The Fourteenth Amendment, in turn, declares that 
“[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”2 As a matter of strict logic, neither 
                                                          
* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.
1 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
2 Id. amend. XIV, § 1. This provision is followed immediately by references to “persons” 
in the contexts of due process and equal protection. Id. (“[N]or shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”).
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passage implies that only citizens hold privileges3 or immunities.4 Persons who are not 
citizens could indeed hold privileges or immunities, but those privileges or immunities 
might not be enforceable—under particular circumstances or at all—on a federal 
constitutional privileges and immunities theory.5 Both clauses thus are compatible 
with the idea that some or all non-citizens possess a range of significant privileges and 
immunities that are enforceable pursuant to federal or state statutes, under the common 
law, or perhaps pursuant to some other constitutional provision.6
In any event, this Article will not explore the possibility that non-citizens may have 
privileges and immunities enforceable by means apart from Article IV or the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The focus, however 
paradoxical, will be on the appeal by non-citizens to the privileges and immunities of 
citizens under either Article IV or the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or 
Immunities Clause. This Article, however, takes no issue with the sensible view that 
privileges and immunities are, for all constitutional purposes and in all cases, directly 
and universally somehow linked with citizens and citizenship.
Properly recognizing the privileges and immunities of actual citizens will, in some 
contexts, and to one degree or another, require what amounts to recognizing related 
privileges and immunities of persons who are not citizens. The standard assumption 
                                                          
3 The Article IV use of privileges and immunities, in the conjunctive, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment use, in contrast, of the disjunctive “or” seem to follow the purposive logic in each
case. It would defeat the purpose of Article IV to allow states to grant privileges but not 
immunities, or immunities but not privileges, assuming some difference between privileges and 
immunities. Hence the conjunctive “and.” The Fourteenth Amendment, in contrast, addresses a 
possible denial, rather than a grant or recognition. While we would not want a state to deny both 
privileges and immunities, we would also not want a state to deny a privilege while recognizing 
an immunity or vice versa, again assuming that privileges and immunities are not identical in 
all contexts. This Article will in any event utilize whichever expression seems most appropriate 
in context.
4 See supra text accompanying notes 1–2. Of course, at least as a first cut, the natural 
reading is to limit privileges and immunities to citizens. See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, 
Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens 
of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1149 (2000) [hereinafter Curtis, Historical 
Linguistics].
5 See Derek Shaffer, Answering Justice Thomas in Saenz: Granting the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause Full Citizenship Within the Fourteenth Amendment, 52 STAN. L. REV. 709, 
741 (2000).
6 Thus, at least technically, one or more privileges or immunities of non-citizens might be 
thought to be enforceable under, say, the Ninth Amendment, the Fifth or Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, or even 
the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 719–20 (1973) (“[A] lawfully 
admitted resident alien is a ‘person’ within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
directive that a State must not ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.’” (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886))).
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that Privileges and Immunities Clause protection,7 unlike due process or equal 
protection,8 realistically extends only to citizens thus turns out to be false.
This outcome is a matter of what one might call, with unnecessary pretentiousness, 
a mistaken social ontology of rights and rights-holders. Less pretentiously, the idea is 
that what we think of as individual constitutional rights, or even as rights held by some 
discrete group, are in reality not exhausted, or fully accounted for, at the level of the 
individual or the discrete group in question.
Instead, the constitutional right, privilege, or immunity at issue is often to some 
degree inherently shared in a way that transcends, and cannot be reduced to, a focus 
on any individual rights-holder. To fully understand such rights, we must think of them 
in terms of inherent relationalism, conjointness, inseparability, reciprocality,
intertwinability, and inextricability, and not everyone who shares a right need fall into 
the same legal classification as everyone else who shares that right.
Thus, in some cases, what we think of as a privilege or immunity of citizen A must 
inherently extend, to one degree or another, to non-citizen B, if citizen A’s privilege 
or immunity is to be properly understood, acknowledged, and meaningfully respected. 
The logic, scope, and limits of what one might call the inherent relationalism of 
privileges and immunities is traced below. As it turns out, the clearest and most 
important contexts involve attempts to pursue some sort of employment relationship.
II. SOME POSSIBLE MEANINGS OF THE ARTICLE IV AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
DISCUSSIONS OF PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
Thinking of privileges and immunities as, in some contexts, inherently relational 
suggests that recognizing what amount to privileges or immunities of some non-
citizens may be necessary to give appropriate scope and meaning to the privileges or 
immunities of some citizens. To be of much interest, however, this approach must at 
least be compatible with one or more sensible readings of either the Article IV or the 
Fourteenth Amendment approach to privileges or immunities.
For purposes of establishing the legitimacy of the idea of an inherent relationalism 
of privileges and immunities, it is actually helpful that the scope and meaning of 
Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment have long been murky and contested.9 At 
a minimum, it is plausible that at least some sensible reading of one or both of these 
constitutional texts is compatible with an inherent relationalism of privileges and 
immunities that can sometimes encompass both citizens and some non-citizens.
Thus, scholars have argued, for example, that ‘“[p]rivileges’ and ‘immunities’ had 
been used to refer to natural and common law rights since the days of Blackstone—if 
the Framers did not want to constitutionalize those rights, it is difficult to understand 
                                                          
7 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons: Reconstructing the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 334, 339–40 (2005); 
Shaffer, supra note 5, at 741 (“The Privileges or Immunities Clause, following the definition of 
citizenship contained in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, by its terms applies only to 
U.S. citizens.”).
8 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 7, at 340. More broadly, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS 169–71 (1998) (noting that the Bill of Rights was intended primarily for the benefit
of citizens, as distinct from resident aliens or non-citizens, even though some Bill of Rights 
protections may well extend, on whatever theory, to non-citizens).
9 See infra notes 10–15 and accompanying text.
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why they chose such language.”10 On this view, well before either clause was enacted, 
“[t]he words rights, liberties, privileges, and immunities, seem to have been used 
interchangeably.”11
In contrast, an equally prominent argument is that “[a]s originally understood, the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause12 did not protect a right to travel, or any other natural 
right.”13 Rather, this argument posits that the role of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause “was to guarantee to an American visiting another state equal access to those 
privileges and immunities that the host state granted its own citizens as an incident of 
citizenship.”14 Such privileges and immunities were, on this view, considered legally 
alterable.15
The most influential early construal of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities 
Clause is doubtless that of Justice Bushrod Washington in Corfield v. Coryell.16 Justice 
Washington opted for a natural law-based interpretation, referring specifically to 
“those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which 
belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, 
been enjoyed by the citizens of several states which compose this Union . . . .”17 As to 
what comprises those privileges and immunities, Justice Washington declined to 
provide anything like an exhaustive list.18 Many such privileges and immunities are 
left unmentioned in Corfield.19 At the most general level, however, such privileges 
and immunities of citizens encompass “[p]rotection by the government; the enjoyment 
of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to 
pursue and obtain happiness and safety . . . .”20
The focus of Article IV, though, is on the privileges and immunities of a citizen of 
some other state who has now ventured into a different state and has suffered therein 
                                                          
10 Evan Bernick, Yes, the Fourteenth Amendment Protects Unenumerated Rights: A 
Response to Kurt Lash, HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2015), www.huffingtonpost.com/evan-
bernick/yes-the-fourteenth. Bernick is referring to Fourteenth Amendment, perhaps as distinct 
from Article IV, privileges and immunities, but Blackstone’s assessment would equally apply 
to either future clause. Id.
11 MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 64–65 (1986) (emphasis in the 
original) (citing several usages pre-dating the Constitution in general); see AMAR, supra note 8, 
at 166–67 (“The plain meanings of [the words ‘right,’ ‘freedom,’ ‘privilege,’ and ‘immunity’] 
are roughly synonymous . . . .” (citing also to CURTIS, supra)); Richard L. Aynes, Ink Blot or 
Not: The Meaning of Privileges and/or Immunities, 11 J. CONST. L. 1295, 1298 (2009) (quoting 
CURTIS, supra, specifically in the nineteenth century context).
12 Referring to U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
13 Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 43 
GA. L. REV. 1117, 1192 (2009).
14 Id.
15 See id. at 1192–93.
16 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823).
17 Id. at 551.
18 See id. at 551–52.
19 See id. at 551.
20 Id. at 551–52.
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some alleged privileges and immunities violation.21 Thus read, the clause is more of a 
non-discrimination provision than a guarantee of substantive rights of in-state and out-
of-state citizens who are temporarily within the state.22 Justice Joseph Story’s treatise, 
from roughly the time of the decision in Corfield, concurs in this essentially non-
discrimination focus.23 Several decades later, in the well-known Myra Bradwell case,24
the Supreme Court observed that the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause “has 
no application to a citizen of the state whose laws are complained of.”25
More recently, the Court has held that privileges and immunities for purposes of 
Article IV do not encompass every respect in which out-of-staters and in-staters might 
be treated differently.26 In United Building & Construction Trades Council v. 
Camden,27 the Court limited Article IV Privileges and Immunities to interests deemed 
“sufficiently ‘fundamental’ to the promotion of interstate harmony”28 or else to “the 
vitality of the Nation as a single entity . . . .”29 Therefore, the Court’s focus was more 
on fundamental Commerce Clause goals30 than on fundamental rights or interests more 
generally.31
                                                          
21 See id.
22 See id.; Epstein, supra note 7, at 343; see also David R. Upham, Corfield v. Coryell and 
the Privileges and Immunities of American Citizenship, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1486 (2005).
23 Justice Story observes:
if the citizens of each state were to be deemed aliens to each other, they could not take, 
or hold real estate, or other privileges except as other aliens. The intention of this clause 
was to confer on them [i.e., presumably citizens of another state], if one may so say, a
general citizenship; and to communicate all the privileges and immunities, which 
citizens of the same state would be entitled to under the like circumstances.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 947, 674 
(Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833).
24 Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 138–39 (1873) (disposing of the claim of Myra Bradwell 
to practice law on the grounds that as a married woman, she would lack independent legal 
personhood and the capacity to be bound by relevant express and implied contracts).
25 Id. at 138; see United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 217 
(1984). The Bradwell case was crucially decided under the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges
or Immunities Clause, the theory being that engaging in the practice of law does not fall within 
the scope of those privileges or immunities one holds as a citizen of the United States in general, 
as opposed to those one holds as a citizen of some particular state. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 138–39
(relying on the contemporaneous Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities-focused 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873)).
26 Camden, 465 U.S. at 218.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. The court also cited to a prior case in which it used the verbiage “maintenance or 
well-being of the Union” to limit Article IV Privileges and Immunities. Id. at 221 (citing 
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978)).
30 See id. at 218–22.
31 One might conceivably think of a privilege against self-incrimination or an immunity 
against multiple prosecutions for the same offense as privileges or immunities for Article IV 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2018
730 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:725
The Camden Court offered no exhaustive inventory of the sorts of interests that 
might fall within the scope of Article IV Privileges and Immunities.32 The Court 
elsewhere has held, at a distinctly specific level, that “the right to practice law is 
protected” as an Article IV Privilege and Immunity.33 More broadly, the Court in 
Camden recognized the “interest in employment on public works contracts” as a 
protectable Article IV Privilege and Immunity.34 And clearly more broadly yet, the 
Camden Court also explicitly endorsed “the pursuit of a common calling [as] one of 
the most fundamental of those privileges protected by the Clause”35 and as a “basic 
and essential activity.”36 At this point, the Court had not yet made the slightest inquiry 
into whatever might or might not have been distinctive in this regard as a matter of 
New Jersey state law.37
Of course, recognition of a privilege or immunity of citizenship does not by itself 
determine the outcome of the case if opposing state interests are involved.38 Our 
primary concern herein, though, is not with the circumstances under which recognized 
privileges and immunities should prevail over opposing interests and values; rather, 
our concern is with the extent to which privileges or immunities of citizens imply, in 
practice, what substantively amount to privileges or immunities of non-citizens.
The meaning of a privilege or immunity of citizens remains contestable if we turn 
to case law and other interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The range of 
reasonable interpretations of privileges or immunities, particularly in the Fourteenth 
Amendment context, is extensive.39 To begin, one might adopt Judge Robert Bork’s 
“ink blot” theory40 or Professor Philip Kurland’s “blank check” theory.41 One might 
instead read the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause as, like that 
                                                          
non-discrimination purposes without thinking exclusively of interstate harmony, or of national 
unity. The Camden Court does offer an arguably slightly broader test for a protectable privilege 
or immunity under Article IV when it refers to interests ‘“sufficiently basic to the livelihood of 
the Nation.’” Id. at 221 (quoting Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388).
32 Id.
33 Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 283 (1985).
34 Camden, 465 U.S. at 218.
35 Id. at 219.
36 Id.; see also id. (referring to “the broader opportunity to pursue a common calling.”).
37 See id. The Court must have presumed that New Jersey public policy, in this respect, 
corresponded to a similar policy of other states or else to the only policy that would be consistent 
with the federal interest in national unity and comity. See id.
38 The test in such cases requires the state to show a “substantial reason” for discriminating 
against out-of-staters, as well as a “close relationship” between the scope of the discrimination 
and the scope of the substantial state interest. Id. at 222. Perhaps a bit more demandingly 
formulated, out-of-staters must be shown to be “a peculiar source” of the public policy harm to 
be remedied. Id. (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398 (1948)).
39 See infra notes 40–46 and accompanying text.
40 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 166 (1997).
41 Philip B. Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: “Its Hour Come Round at 
Last”?, WASH. U. L.Q. 405, 408 (1972) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or 
Immunities Clause “was a blank check drawn on an account without funds”).
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss4/6
2018] THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF NON-CITIZENS 731
of Article IV, promoting equality of rights, whatever they may be, rather than 
protecting particular substantive rights.42 Or one might view Fourteenth Amendment 
“privileges or immunities as participatory privileges of citizenship, rather than 
personal rights of individual liberty . . . ”43
More substantively, the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause 
has also been read as “an attempt to resolve a national dispute about the Comity Clause 
rights of free blacks.”44 In contrast, others have argued more broadly that “the authors 
of the Clause largely believed that it would provide greater security to the privileges 
guaranteed in Article IV.”45 Alternatively, others assert that “those who advanced the 
cause of the Privileges or Immunities Clause understood it to require the States to 
respect certain fundamental rights.”46
The latter fundamental rights interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Privileges or Immunities Clause was, importantly, endorsed by Justice Clarence 
Thomas prior to his ascension to the Supreme Court.47 At the time of a 1988 
symposium, Thomas associated the Clause with certain natural and “fundamental 
rights of the American regime—those of life, liberty, and property.”48 Others argue, 
relatedly, that “‘[p]rivileges’ and ‘immunities’ had been used to refer to natural and 
common law rights since the days of Blackstone . . . .”49
Thus, Professor Michael Kent Curtis has argued that “the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause was designed to make the Constitution 
what its preamble promised—a guarantee of liberty.”50 The liberties in question, 
according to Professor Curtis, include those specified in the Bill of Rights;51 the 
                                                          
42 See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385, 1387–88 (1992). For a similar reading of the Article IV clause, see supra note 22 and 
accompanying text.
43 Daniel J. Levin, Reading the Privileges or Immunities Clause: Textual Irony, Analytic 
Revisionism, and an Interpretive Truce, 35 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 569, 570 (2000).
44 Philip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 61, 61–62 (2011).
45 David R. Upham, The Meanings of the “Privileges and Immunities of Citizens” on the 
Eve of the Civil War, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1117, 1118 (2016).
46 D. Scott Broyles, Doubting Thomas: Justice Clarence Thomas’s Effort to Resurrect the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 46 IND. L. REV. 341, 342 (2013).
47 See Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63 (1989).
48 Id. at 68. This view links “fundamentality” to matters of life, liberty, and property, 
however either grievous or minimal the restriction thereof. Among the resulting interpretive 
questions would be what this approach to privileges and immunities adds to the simultaneously 
adopted, and textually adjacent, explicit focus on deprivations of life, liberty, and property. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
49 Bernick, supra note 10.
50 Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the 
Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996).
51 Curtis, Historical Linguistics, supra note 4, at 1146.
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privileges enshrined in Article IV, Section 2;52 the writ of habeas corpus;53 immunity 
from ex post facto legislation;54 equal protection of the laws;55 the right to travel;56 a
criminal conviction standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt;57 and other 
unspecified privileges.58
Finally, Professor John Hart Ely has emphasized not merely the breadth but also 
the open-endedness of the scope of binding protection59 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Privileges or Immunities Clause.60 When adding this sense of open-endedness to the 
various fundamental right,61 natural right,62 common law right,63 and generally broad 
and expansivist64 interpretations noted above, a generally broad and encompassing 
view of Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities is within the contemporary 
mainstream at least as to the substance of privileges and immunities (if not as to who 
can bear such privileges and immunities).
Of course, the constitutional case history for many years, if not still today, 
suggested otherwise. The classic Slaughter-House cases65 famously sought to limit the 
scope as well as the significance of the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or 
Immunities Clause.66 Justice Miller’s majority opinion distinguished between 
citizenship of a particular state and United States citizenship.67 Only the latter, which 
did not include rights to pursue a gainful occupation,68 were addressed and additionally 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.69
According to Justice Miller, among the privileges and immunities of citizens of a 
particular state are “protection by the government, with the right to acquire and possess 
                                                          
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. How this would affect the enforceability, or the stringency, of equal protection rights 
in various contexts raises intriguing and complex issues.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 23–24 (1980).
60 See id. at 28.
61 See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
62 See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
63 See id.
64 See supra notes 50–58 and accompanying text.
65 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
66 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 43 (1975) (explicating the 
policy logic of Justice Miller’s majority opinion).
67 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 74.
68 Id. at 80.
69 Id. at 74.
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property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety . . . .”70 In 
contrast, the privileges and immunities accruing to a citizen of the United States itself 
included, among other rights, the right to come to the government to press any claim,71
to transact any business with the government,72 to share in its offices73 and its 
administration,74 to access seaports,75 to seek protection on the high seas76 and under 
foreign governments,77 and to use the navigable waters of the United States.78
The right to come to the seat of government to assert one’s claim would also seem, 
as the Court evidently recognizes, to imply something like a “right to peaceably 
assemble and petition for redress of grievances . . . .”79 The Court also acknowledges 
a federal citizenship-based privilege of habeas corpus.80 Relatedly, though explicitly 
focused on a citizen’s rights against state governments, a federal citizen is to have 
access to “courts of justice in the several States”81 along with the right to change one’s 
state citizenship.82
Oddly, the Slaughter-House majority concluded this inventory of the protected 
privileges and immunities of federal citizens by referring to the rights protected, 
whether of citizens or of persons, under the Thirteenth Amendment,83 the Fifteenth 
Amendment,84 and the remainder of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses.85 The majority did not address whether 
Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities protection of one’s pre-established 
rights under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments serves any 
practical purpose.86
                                                          
70 Id. at 76.
71 Id. at 79.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. Presumably, these and other privileges could have analogues under Article IV, at least 
where states choose to recognize a privilege to, say, participate in government business.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 80.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 See id. Of course, the need for Fourteenth Amendment protection, as against state law, 
of pre-existing federal privileges and immunities seems dubious given the trumping role of the 
Supremacy Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. For the sense in which Article IV Privileges 
and Immunities protection may at least in some cases be redundant given the Equal Protection 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2018
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Whatever one thinks of the Slaughter-House majority opinion, its primary focus 
seemingly is not on any distinction between federal citizens and non-citizens, or on 
federal citizens and any class of aliens. Rather, the emphasis seems to be on what the 
majority perceives as either validating or invalidating the idea of a substantial shift in 
how the privileges and immunities of state citizens are to be protected.87 The 
majority’s idea seems to be that substantively protecting such rights—as opposed to 
merely not discriminating against out-of-staters—should continue to be left to state 
law as opposed to federal constitutional law.88 Thus, the focus of the Slaughter-House
majority is really more on limiting federal authority relative to the states,89 not to a 
focus on who is entitled to particular state-level or federal-level privileges or 
immunities.
In any event, the basic logic of the Slaughter-House majority was eventually 
challenged in the case of Saenz v. Roe.90 Saenz involved limitations on welfare benefits 
for, among others, persons who had recently migrated to California and could now 
claim to be resident-citizens of California.91 The majority in Saenz concluded that such 
cases of the broader right to travel92 were governed not only by the Article IV 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, but also by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges 
or Immunities Clause.93 The Saenz majority thus recognized some manifestations of a 
right to travel as a substantive privilege or immunity, binding on the states in virtue of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of privileges or immunities.94
In his dissenting opinion in Saenz,95 Justice Thomas looked to history in an attempt 
to determine the proper meaning and role of privileges and immunities of citizens.96
On Justice Thomas’s view, the colonists and Framers understood “privileges” and 
“immunities” in general “to refer to those fundamental rights and liberties specifically 
enjoyed by English citizens and, more broadly, by all persons.”97 On such a view, the 
                                                          
Clause test for implied fundamental rights, see infra note 190. We hereby set aside questions of 
the comparative stringency of protection under alternative clauses.
87 See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 74.
88 See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 66, at 43.
89 See generally Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. 36. Note the Court’s continuing concern for 
analogous federal versus state power relationships in some of the later Commerce Clause cases, 
including, for example, United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); Hammer v. 
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); and 
Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (finding that major league baseball is 
not within the scope of congressional interstate Commerce Clause regulatory power).
90 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
91 Id. at 493–94.
92 Id. at 502.
93 Id. at 502–03.
94 See id. at 502–04.
95 Id. at 521–28 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion was joined 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 521.
96 Id. at 522.
97 Id. at 524.
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rights constitutionally protected as genuine “privileges” and “immunities” were 
apparently substantive.98 The Constitution did not merely offer guarantees against 
discrimination or inequality of treatment with regard to the otherwise state-recognized 
right in question.99 A crucial limitation, though, seems to be that privileges and 
immunities must be somehow fundamental in their character rather than secondary or 
derivative in their character or importance.100
Of particular interest for our purposes is Justice Thomas’s understanding of 
colonial history where, at least at some early stage,101 the fundamental rights classified 
as privileges and immunities were to be enjoyed not just by English citizens, but “more 
broadly, by all persons.”102 This logic suggests that privileges and immunities might 
more accurately be thought of as natural or human rights, held by all persons, whether 
the person in question is a citizen or not.103
More explicitly, if a right of any sort counts as genuinely fundamental, it is difficult 
to see why the right-holders in question would be indifferent as to whether the 
particular right is respected as a substantive right or not as long as everyone’s right is 
equally respected or else equally denied in a non-discriminatory way. It is also difficult 
to see why right-holders would be satisfied with a situation in which the right in 
question is subject to complete and utter violation by state-level governments as long 
as the federal government does not also violate the right.
Rather than press such matters, though, let us conclude this Section with a sense
of Justice Thomas’s more fully elaborated thoughts on the proper role of the 
Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause. The later case of McDonald 
v. City of Chicago104 addressed whether the Second Amendment’s individual right to 
keep and bear arms105 is also binding as against state-level governments.106 The 
McDonald plurality, not including Justice Thomas, acknowledged the controversial 
nature of the narrow construction in the Slaughter-House cases of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause107 as well as the later privileges or 
immunities revival and revisionism of Saenz.108 But the plurality explicitly declined to 
                                                          
98 See Harrison, supra note 42.
99 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 524 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
100 Id.
101 See id.
102 Id.
103 See id. For further discussion, see Tim A. Lemper, The Promise and Perils of “Privileges 
or Immunities”: Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999), 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 320–
21 (1999) (noting some possible alternative futures for the logic of the Saenz case); Douglas G. 
Smith, A Return to First Principles? Saenz v. Roe and the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
2000 UTAH L. REV. 305, 305 (2001).
104 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
105 As adjudicated in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
106 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 758–59 (plurality opinion).
107 Id. at 756–57.
108 Id.
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revisit the privileges or immunities doctrine109 and instead addressed the question 
before the Court as a matter of Fourteenth Amendment due process.110
Justice Thomas, however, issued an opinion concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment.111 On his view, the right to keep and bear arms was not most 
appropriately protected against state interference through the literally procedural 
rights-focused Due Process Clause.112 Instead, Justice Thomas forthrightly declared 
that “the right to keep and bear arms is a privilege of American citizenship that applies 
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities 
Clause.”113 This approach was grounded in part on Justice Thomas’s view that there is 
a greater overlap between state and federal privileges and immunities than the 
Slaughter-House cases recognized.114 The idea that at least some rights recognized 
under Article IV are also encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges 
or Immunities Clause is, in any event, at this point a defensible, mainstream approach 
to understanding the scope of privileges and immunities in general.
III. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES AND SOME ASSERTED RIGHTS OF ALIENS
Aliens present within the United States, whether documented or undocumented, 
count as “persons” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses.115 As the Court in Plyler v. Doe116 recognized, “[a]liens, even 
aliens whose presence in the country is unlawful, have long been recognized as 
‘persons’ guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”117
                                                          
109 Id. at 758.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 805 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
112 Id. at 806.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 855 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I reject 
Slaughter-House insofar as it precludes any overlap between the privileges and immunities of 
state and federal citizenship.”).
115 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212–15 (1982) (providing equal protection to 
undocumented children seeking equal access rights to Texas public schools); Sugarman v. 
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641 (1973) (finding in an alien state public employment case that “[i]t 
is established, of course, that an alien is entitled to the shelter of the equal protection clause.”) 
(citing, among other cases, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971)). In the context of 
pursuing, within reasonable constraints, a gainful occupation, trade, or employment, see the 
classic alienage equal protection case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). Yick 
Wo was, in turn, cited for the broad principle that “the right to work for a living in the common 
occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity 
that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure.” Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 
41 (1915) (citing, among other cases, Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356).
116 Plyler, 457 U.S. 202.
117 Id. at 210 (citing Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953); Wong Wing v. United 
States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369). For a discussion of education as a 
national-level privilege or immunity of citizens, see Kara A. Millonzi, Education as a Right of 
National Citizenship Under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
81 N.C. L. REV. 1286 (2003).
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More broadly, “[a]liens may . . . be said to enjoy certain incidents of ‘equal citizenship’ 
in our society by virtue of their possession of an important range of fundamental rights, 
notwithstanding their lack of status-citizenship.”118 Of course, falling as a class within 
the scope or coverage of a constitutional right by itself tells us little about the real 
strength of the right or about the scope of one’s opportunities to exercise that right.119
A right of aliens to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment, as binding 
on the states,120 is far from clearly settled.121 The Second Amendment, after all, refers 
to “the people”122 as the literal bearer of the right in question.123 Therefore, the question 
of whether aliens fall within the scope of the Second Amendment’s coverage would 
seem to hinge on whether aliens are not merely people, but also within the scope of 
“the people” for Second Amendment purposes.
One position suggests that, at least in some contexts, “[t]he words ‘people of the 
United States’ and ‘citizens’ are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing.”124
Some Justices have challenged this formulation, however,125 as well as the idea that 
“the people” must have the same meaning in each of its various constitutional 
references.126 At least in the Fourth Amendment and some other contexts, the Court 
has concluded that “the people” refers to “a class of persons who are part of a national 
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country 
                                                          
118 Linda Bosniak, Constitutional Citizenship Through the Prism of Alienage, 63 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1285 (2002).
119 For the distinction between the coverage and the degree of protection of a right, see 
Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of 
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769–74 (2004).
120 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758–59 (2010) (plurality opinion).
121 See Justine Farris, The Right of Non-Citizens to Bear Arms: Understanding “The 
People” of the Second Amendment, 50 IND. L. REV. 943 (2017); Maria Stracqualursi, 
Undocumented Immigrants Caught in the Crossfire: Resolving the Circuit Split on “The 
People” and the Applicable Level of Scrutiny for Second Amendment Challenges, 57 B.C. L.
REV. 1447 (2016).
122 U.S. Const. amend. II.
123 Id.
124 This oddly redundant statement is drawn from the notorious Dred Scott case. Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404 (1857).
125 See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265–67 (1990) (plurality 
opinion).
126 For a discussion of possible meanings of “the people” in the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, 
and Tenth Amendments, see id. (defining “the people” as generally “a class of persons who are 
part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this 
country to be considered part of that community.”). For a recognition that “the people” does not 
have precisely the same meaning in all constitutional contexts, see United States v. Meza-
Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 670 (7th Cir. 2015) (emphasizing, however, a similarity of the term’s 
meaning across the Bill of Rights).
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to be considered part of that community.”127 In comparison, the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause certainly has no explicit broad exclusion of non-citizens.128
The problem with any such formulation is that “community” may vary in its scope 
and meaning at least as much as the idea of a “people.” Communities can be “thick” 
or “intensive” as well as “thin” or less restrictively conceived.129 Specifying that the 
“community” exists at the national level rules out some possible meanings of the idea 
of community, but still leaves us with too broad a range of possible interpretations to 
meaningfully constrain the idea of “the people” in any constitutional context.130
Importantly, the relationship between various sorts of alienages and the idea of a 
national or political community is of little assistance in determining the relationships 
between classes of alienage and membership in a national “people.”
Thus, if a court chooses to emphasize a particular undocumented alien’s sustained, 
extensive, multi-faceted ties to the United States, the conclusion that such a person 
should count as within the scope of “the people,” though not also as a citizen, for 
Second Amendment purposes will seem reasonable.131 At least for the present, most 
courts have categorically judged undocumented aliens, regardless of their established 
connections or circumstances, as outside the scope of the national political community 
and therefore not of “the people” for purposes of the Second Amendment right to keep 
and bear arms.132
The Second Amendment’s text seems to direct us to inherently contestable 
questions as to whether particular aliens or classes of aliens should count, at least for 
Second Amendment purposes, as members of the national or political community. 
This approach may be unavoidable on a textualist theory of the Constitution.133 Other 
theories, though, may recognize or expand the rights of aliens to keep and bear arms 
depending on the strength of the right in question.134 Thus, a presumed natural right to 
                                                          
127 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
128 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
129 Perhaps the most conceptually sophisticated account of the ambiguities of “community” 
is that of ANDREW MASON, COMMUNITY, SOLIDARITY AND BELONGING 4 (2000). Classically, see 
FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY (Jose Harris, ed., Jose Harris & Margaret 
Hollis trans., 2001) (1887). See also WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP (David 
Miller & Alan Ryan eds., 1995), along with the evolving understandings of “the community”
in Western and Central Europe.
130 See generally The Meaning(s) of “The People” in the Constitution, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1078, 1078–79 (2013) [hereinafter Meaning(s) of “The People”].
131 See Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 670–72.
132 See United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 976 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 440, 442 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Flores, 663 F.3d 1022, 
1023 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (affirming a conviction on the basis of the logic of Portillo-
Munoz, 643 F.3d 437). For discussion of the cases in this area, see Farris, supra note 121, at 
950–56; Stracqualursi, supra note 121, at 1461–65; Meaning(s) of “The People”, supra note 
130, at 1078–79.
133 See Thomas E. Baker, Constitutional Theory in a Nutshell, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 57, 95–96 (2004).
134 See id. at 107–08.
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self-preservation, or taking measures for the bare physical protection of self and 
others, would seem to apply to all classes of aliens no less than to citizens.135
Whether any citizen’s right to keep and bear arms could somehow practically 
require some relational right of one or more aliens, perhaps as a matter of effective 
common or collective defense, we may set aside as speculative. At a minimum, the 
meaningfulness of one person’s right to self-protection may well depend upon 
recognizing something like an analogous right in other persons. Security may in some 
respects be inherently collective.
Beyond the context of the Second Amendment, a possibly more controversial 
argument, for example, is in favor of a right of at least some aliens to vote in federal 
or in state and local elections. After all, one’s citizenship or alienage status may tell 
us little about, say, the duration of an adult’s United States residence, one’s status as 
a person who is relevantly informed or uninformed, or the extent to which one’s life 
is likely to be affected by an electoral outcome. The focus of a number of relevant 
constitutional cases is on preventing qualified citizens from being denied the right to 
vote rather than on confining the franchise to citizens only.136 And to the extent that 
voting in state elections is a matter of either equal protection or substantive due 
process,137 the protected class on such a theory is generally assumed to be persons 
rather than citizens.138 Presumably, constitutional-level debates over the voting rights 
of aliens will focus mainly on questions of equal protection of laws rather than on 
anyone’s privileges or immunities.139 We may set aside voting rights contexts as, at 
least for the historical moment, not sufficiently implicating any shared, joint, or 
relational quality of the rights at stake.
Of much greater immediate interest are the cases in which local governments 
arguably seek, on one ground or another, to restrict the processes by which aliens and 
others may pursue or obtain an otherwise licit gainful occupation or trade.140 These 
employment cases best illustrate our main thesis and for that reason warrant separate 
consideration.
                                                          
135 For discussion of a presumed natural right of self-preservation, see District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593–94 (2008); United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1165–
66 (10th Cir. 2012). The most fundamental classic discussion of the moral and motivational 
status of self-preservation is probably that of THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN chs. 13–14 (Richard 
Tuck ed., 1991) (1668).
136 See David M. Howard, Potential Citizens’ Rights: The Case for Permanent Resident 
Voting, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1393, 1414 (2017).
137 See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354–60 (1972) (focusing on residency 
requirements for voting in a local election and discussing the legitimacy of a state interest in 
having knowledgeable voters); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) 
(focusing on residency requirements for voting in a local election and applying equal protection 
strict scrutiny).
138 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
139 See Virginia Harper-Ho, Noncitizen Voting Rights: The History, the Law and Current 
Prospects for Change, 18 LAW & INEQ. 271, 285–93 (2000).
140 See, e.g., Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay, 868 
F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2017); Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808, 814 (9th Cir. 2013); 
Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 940 (9th Cir. 
2011).
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IV. ALIEN EMPLOYMENT TRAFFIC RESTRICTION AS DIRECTLY IMPACTING THE 
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENS
In some respects, state law restrictions on the employment opportunities of aliens 
specifically are entirely familiar.141 In general, courts tend to uphold reasonable 
restrictions on alien employment against equal protection challenges if the position in 
question involves either discretionary law enforcement or perhaps what one might call 
“socializing other persons to good citizenship.”142 However, this Article focuses 
elsewhere. In particular, this Article considers instead the recent challenges to local 
ordinances adversely affecting the ability of day laborers and their potential 
employers, or the agents of the latter, to arrange for such employment.143 Such 
ordinances have been attacked primarily as limitations on freedom of speech and on 
commercial speech in particular.144
A point of debate is whether free speech law, as relating to commercial speech or 
not, is really the essence of these day labor employment cases. But even if the courts 
insist on treating these cases exclusively as First Amendment cases,145 an alternative 
focus on the practically crucial matter of obtaining gainful employment and pursuing 
an occupation or trade as a constitutionally protected146 privilege or immunity can 
offer important insights. Ultimately, the key point is that the privileges or immunities 
                                                          
141 See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 69 (1979) (permitting exclusion of aliens as 
public school teachers under the equal protection clause); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 292 
(1978) (permitting exclusion of aliens from employment as state police officers under an equal 
protection challenge); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 717–18 (1973) (preventing aliens from 
being excluded from bar membership under the Equal Protection Clause); Sugarman v. Dougall, 
413 U.S. 634, 635 (1973) (finding exemptions for the New York State Civil Service that prevent 
aliens from employment in some principal positions, elected positions, and positions filled by 
either the governor or the legislature).
142 See, e.g., Ambach, 441 U.S. 68; Foley, 435 U.S. 291.
143 See, e.g., Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley, 868 F.3d at 104.
144 See Ambach, 441 U.S. 68; Foley, 435 U.S. 291; In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717; Sugarman,
413 U.S. 634.
145 See, e.g., Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley, 868 F.3d at 112.
146 The actual strength of protection afforded Article IV Privileges and Immunities is a bit 
under-theorized. There seems to be a hybrid scrutiny test combining a mid-level weight of a 
government interest with, apparently, something akin to strict scrutiny narrow tailoring. Thus, 
in the Article IV context, the Court required merely a “substantial” government interest and a 
“close” degree of tailoring between the substantial interest and the actual impact of the 
regulation. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 222 (1984). Those 
adversely affected by the government regulation must also constitute “a peculiar source of the 
evil” sought to be remedied by the regulation. Id.
In the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities context, the Court has, at least in a travel 
or residency-change context, suggested the applicability of a strict scrutiny test of any 
substantial impingement. Thus, in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504 (1999), the Court endorsed 
“[n]either mere rationality nor some intermediate standard of review . . . . The appropriate 
standard may be more categorical . . . but it is surely no less strict [than the strict scrutiny 
standard applied in the durational residency case of Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 
(1969), overruled by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)].”
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of citizens extends, inherently, on its own relationalist logic to encompass at least 
some documented and undocumented aliens.
Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay presents 
a typical scenario among recent day labor employment restriction cases.147 After 
recognizing the plaintiff’s standing in the case,148 the court immediately addressed the 
free speech merits149 of the ordinance in question, ultimately finding the ordinance 
failed to meet the tailoring requirements imposed on content-based regulations of 
commercial speech.150 The regulation purportedly was adopted “to protect residents 
from the dangers of obstruction, distraction, and delays of traffic caused by the 
solicitation of employment by pedestrians.”151 The impetus for the regulation 
seemingly was public reaction to “daily gatherings of usually 20–30, but sometimes 
50, day laborers soliciting employment along a four-block stretch of Oyster Bay’s 
Forest Avenue . . . .”152 Some local residents referred merely to traffic problems,153 but 
“others premised their objections on their views as to the laborers’ immigration 
status[es].”154
The text of the ordinance in question declared:
It shall be unlawful for any person standing within or adjacent to any public 
right-of-way within the Town of Oyster Bay to stop or attempt to stop any 
motor vehicle utilizing said right-of-way for the purpose of soliciting 
employment of any kind from the occupants of said motor vehicle.155
Presumably, the intent of the regulation was to include vehicle drivers or occupants 
who function merely as agents, or other intermediaries who may lack the authority to 
actually offer any employment.156
More curiously, the ordinance by its terms seemed to encompass initiative-taking 
only by prospective employees or, presumably, prospective independent 
contractors.157 The ordinance did not appear to envision a situation in which occupants 
of a vehicle take the initiative of stopping at some customary or standard location and 
                                                          
147 See Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley, 868 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2017).
148 Id. at 111.
149 Id. at 112.
150 Id. (citing the standard commercial speech regulation case of Central Hudson Gas & 
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). We here set aside the possibility 
of content-neutral restrictions on commercial speech, whether the test in any such case might 
vary from that of Central Hudson or not.
151 Id. at 107–08 (citation omitted).
152 Id. at 108.
153 Id.
154 Id.; see Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808, 815 (9th Cir. 2013) (referring to the 
number of “illegal immigrants” involved).
155 Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley, 868 F.3d at 107 (citation omitted).
156 See id.
157 See id.
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opening the door to initiate an encounter with gathered pedestrians.158 In typical cases, 
though, either the vehicle occupant or the waiting pedestrian could just as easily 
initiate any encounter.159 Only the latter variant, however, would seem to be within the 
scope of the ordinance.
The ordinance went on to “exempt[] the solicitation of a wide variety of ‘[s]ervice 
related activities such as taxicabs, limousine services, public transportation vehicles, 
towing operations, ambulance service and similar uses.’”160 But how often do day 
laborers stop any of these vehicles precisely to solicit employment from their 
occupants? In any event, an explicit exemption exists that covers all such vehicles.161
On the free speech merits, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the 
ordinance has a conduct, or non-speech, element consisting of the pedestrian’s 
stopping or attempting to stop a vehicle.162 The court then further assumed a speech 
element to the ordinance as well;163 speech by the prospective day laborer that was 
irrelevant to a purpose of soliciting employment would be permissible under the 
ordinance.164 On the other hand, speech that essentially proposed a commercial 
transaction, presumably including speech soliciting day labor employment, was 
normally considered to be commercial speech.165 The court thus applied a standard 
intermediate scrutiny test for regulations of commercial speech from the Central 
Hudson case.166
Ultimately, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals took advantage of the 
indeterminacy of “tailoring” inquiries167 to conclude that the ordinance’s potential 
speech impact was insufficiently tailored to its purposes.168 The court colorfully 
observed, among other considerations, that the ordinance would apply to “children 
selling lemonade at the end of a neighbor’s driveway . . . , the veteran holding a sign 
                                                          
158 See id.
159 See id. at 108.
160 Id. at 107 (citation omitted). Let us note in particular that typically, one does not stop an 
ambulance in order to purse gainful employment opportunities with the ambulance crew.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 112.
163 Id.
164 Id.; see text accompanying supra note 155.
165 Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley, 868 F.3d at 112. The court also 
referred to the speech regulation as content-based, which might suggest the application of strict 
scrutiny. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). But the court quickly 
declared that the standard mid-level test for (content-based) regulations of commercial speech 
was the applicable free speech test. Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley, 868
F.3d at 112.
166 See the four-part intermediate scrutiny test laid out in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. 
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
167 For discussion of the manipulability of most sorts of “tailoring” inquiries, see R. George 
Wright, Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations of Speech: A Distinction that Is No 
Longer Worth the Fuss, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2081 (2016).
168 Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley, 868 F.3d at 115–17.
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on a sidewalk stating ‘will work for food,’ and students standing on the side of a road 
advertising a school carwash.”169
The court also rejected defendant-Town of Oyster Bay’s argument that the 
tailoring requirement under Central Hudson need not be met.170 The court rejected the 
argument on the grounds that typical day laborer speech would be constitutionally 
unprotected, as such speech would ultimately aim at a transaction that would likely 
violate “immigration, tax, and labor laws . . . .”171 On the court’s view, though, the 
ordinance also “could be applied to prohibit speech proposing no illegal 
transaction.”172
Overall, analyzing day labor regulations as free speech cases or, for that matter, as 
equal protection cases should not face any objection. Certainly, the recurring 
references to immigrant status173 suggest at least the possibility of the latter analysis.
Courts’ analytical focus on free speech in day laborer traffic regulation cases is 
not, however, beyond critique. After all, the commercial transactions regulated in 
Oyster Bay and elsewhere need not actually involve any contemporaneous speech of 
any sort. The ordinance refers to stopping or attempting to stop a vehicle.174 The stop 
must also be for a particular purpose: obtaining employment.175 But neither having a 
purpose nor stopping a vehicle with any such purpose requires speech. The vehicle’s 
stopping may consummate the transaction, at least as far as the local traffic regulation 
is concerned. The involved parties do not need to exchange any words, at least at the 
relevant time, or make any visual signals. The interaction does not require 
contemporaneous speech of any sort, symbolic or otherwise. The parties certainly can 
discuss terms and conditions of any employment later when outside the geographical 
bounds of the ordinance.
Otherwise put, in some cases covered by the ordinance, the driver of the vehicle 
and one or more pedestrians could briefly discuss the possibility of employment or 
one or more terms of such employment at the regulated location, bringing the 
transaction within the scope of commercial speech.176 But they do not need to employ 
words or other symbols or symbolic acts while at the regulated site. Standing, as 
almost anyone might, at a particular corner under particular circumstances and 
                                                          
169 Id. at 116. This citation is not intended to endorse the claim that all of these hypothetical 
cases would actually fall within the scope of the ordinance in question. To offer to sell a glass 
of lemonade is not typically thought of as a solicitation for employment. For similar 
hypothetical events within the scope of a somewhat similar ordinance, see Comite de Jornaleros 
de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 948 (2011).
170 See Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley, 868 F.3d at 114.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 See text accompanying supra notes 154, 171.
174 See text accompanying supra note 155.
175 Of course, in some contexts, physically standing in front of someone, or pushing 
someone, can convey an entirely clear specific message. We would nonetheless in many such 
cases hesitate to classify mere undifferentiated standing or pushing as a form of constitutional 
speech.
176 See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980).
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entering the deliberately stopped vehicle may by itself contextually convey all that 
needs to be conveyed in the moment. This may be particularly true if the pedestrians 
recognize either the driver or the vehicle as familiar, repeat transactional players.
Thus, while commercial speech may, in some instances, take place while the 
participants remain within the logical scope of the ordinance, speech or symbolic 
conduct177 are hardly of the essence of the regulated behavior. One might argue that 
standing on a corner, again as almost anyone might, while waiting for a vehicle counts, 
under the circumstances, as a form of constitutional speech or that specifically entering 
a stopped vehicle, given the circumstances, typically counts as symbolic speech. But 
this would require a relatively broad and controversial interpretation of what counts, 
for constitutional purposes, as symbolism.178 For instance, we certainly do not 
normally think of the undifferentiated boarding of a bus as an environmental 
statement.
The courts nevertheless seem inclined to treat day laborer traffic ordinance cases 
as regulations of speech.179 Such emphasis does not deserve any objection if it is not 
exclusive of other theories. One could sensibly argue, though, that such cases are 
often, if not typically, as much about obtaining employment by one means or another 
as about speech on any subject.180 The aim, or “purpose” as the Oyster Bay ordinance 
has it,181 of the regulated parties’ conduct is to obtain some form of gainful 
employment, at least for the day.182 Regardless of how many of the regulated persons 
wish to contemporaneously speak, presumably all of them wish to pursue gainful 
employment. The pursuit of gainful employment takes place—under the ordinance if 
not also by definition—at least at the sites and circumstances within the scope of the 
ordinance.183
Crucially, the pursuit of gainful employment or of some occupation or trade is of 
constitutional privileges or immunities status on at least some reasonable views. 
Classically, but merely for example, Justice Washington paved the way for such 
                                                          
177 For classic symbolic speech or mixed speech and conduct cases, see Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969) (wearing of black arm bands in 
Vietnam War-era protest); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369 (1968) (burning of draft 
card in public in Vietnam War-era protest).
178 Currently, to be considered symbolic speech, the conduct must meet a two-part test. 
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (finding that in order for speech to qualify as 
symbolic, there must be “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message” and that “in the 
surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by 
those who viewed it.”).
179 See, e.g., Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay, 868 
F.3d 104, 112 (2d Cir. 2017); Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808, 818 (9th Cir. 2013); 
Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 944–45 (9th 
Cir. 2011).
180 See Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley, 868 F.3d at 107.
181 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
182 Id.
183 See Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley, 868 F.3d at 107.
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recognition in the Article IV Privileges and Immunities case of Corfield v. Coryell.184
In Corfield, Justice Washington referred to the protected status, for Article IV 
purposes, of “the right to acquire and possess property of every kind,”185 along with 
“the enjoyment of life and liberty,”186 subject to an overriding public interest.187
As the case law accrued, the notion that “the pursuit of a common calling is one of 
the most fundamental of those privileges protected by the [Article IV Privileges and 
Immunities] Clause” became well-established.188 According to the Supreme Court 
itself, the pursuit of a common calling, or employment, is among the most typically 
addressed privileges and immunities.189 Thus, seeking employment, at least for Article 
IV contexts and purposes,190 is reasonably seen as a “basic and essential activity.”191
Pursuit of employment, of a common calling, or of gainful employment certainly 
is more than speech in the regulated context and is the essence of the activity subject 
to the ordinance in Oyster Bay and in similar cases.192 But under Article IV, no less 
than under the Fourteenth Amendment, how documented or undocumented aliens 
could benefit from constitutional privileges or immunities (those assumed to have 
been intended to benefit only citizens)193 is far from clear.
In some Article IV contexts, the Court has treated the ideas of “citizens” and 
“residents” as essentially synonymous.194 One can easily imagine an alien who 
qualifies in relevant respects as a “resident” of a particular state, whether or not the 
currently sought-after employment is within that state.195 This limited categorical 
equivalence would seem to imply that even an alien can qualify, in crucial respects, as 
a “citizen.”196 But as the case law does not seem to consider or endorse any such 
logic,197 this Article shall set this notion aside.
                                                          
184 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823); see supra notes 16–20 and 
accompanying text.
185 Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 552.
188 United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219 (1984).
189 Id.
190 Again, Article IV is typically interpreted not as establishing any substantive rights, but 
as in effect requiring something like equal protection of out-of-staters venturing into one’s own 
state, with respect to whatever privileges and immunities happen to be recognized for in-staters. 
See, e.g., id. at 216 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948)).
191 Id. at 219.
192 See, e.g., Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay, 868 
F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2017).
193 But see text accompanying supra notes 3–6.
194 See, e.g., Camden, 465 U.S. at 216 (citing Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 
n.8 (1975)).
195 See id. at 233 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
196 See id.
197 See Camden, 465 U.S. at 216–17 and the relevant authorities cited therein.
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Instead, consider merely the mainstream understanding that under either Article 
IV or the Fourteenth Amendment, the pursuit of gainful employment by some sort of 
contractually negotiated process can count as a privilege or immunity of 
acknowledged citizens.198 The crucial point, then, is that pursuing employment, a 
trade, a calling, or some occupation, whether temporarily or on a more sustained basis, 
is in its very essence an interpersonal activity.199 The status of employee, in its essence, 
requires another person in the status of employer. The status of being employed thus
inherently implies some sort of interpersonal relationship, in which both parties have 
some direct and immediate reciprocal, if also partly conflicting, interest.
Whether the person seeking or enjoying employment is an alien (documented or 
undocumented) does not affect the inherent relationalism of any sort of employment. 
And some aliens who seek, negotiate over, or enjoy employment, at one time or 
another, engage in that transaction or transactional relationship with one or more 
acknowledged citizens of the United States.200
In all such cases, the parties inherently and directly share the privilege or immunity 
of gainful employment status. A meaningful right or privilege to seek out and sustain 
a relationship with an employer requires some corresponding right of another party to 
negotiate over and offer employment if that party is so disposed. An employer could 
hardly pursue their own chosen calling, occupation, or trade without a corresponding 
privilege to negotiate with or take on necessary employees. For instance, an individual 
could hardly flourish in any service, construction, manufacturing, or certainly any 
number of high-tech enterprises without a right or privilege of negotiating with and 
hiring and maintaining employees.
Thus, as a matter of practice and logic, a denial of employment opportunities to an 
alien, on grounds of non-citizenship, may in a given case immediately, directly, and 
inescapably adversely affect the corresponding privilege of a citizen-status employer 
to hire the prospective employee in question, thereby correspondingly impairing the 
citizen-employer in their own gainful calling. To impair the livelihood-pursuit of the 
former is inevitably to impair the livelihood-pursuit of the latter to one degree or 
another. By very loose analogy, the status of the head of a coin as up or down is 
logically inseparable from the status of the tail of the coin.
Whether a restriction on hiring opportunities is more deeply felt by the prospective 
employer or by the prospective employee, or even by the citizen and the alien, cannot 
be determined in advance. The gravity of the practical effect on both will be a matter 
                                                          
198 See supra notes 179–97; see, e.g., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 227 (2013) (“[T]he 
Privileges and Immunities Clause protects the right of citizens to ‘ply their trade, practice their 
occupation, or pursue a common calling.’” (quoting Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 
(1978))); Eric R. Claeys, Blackstone’s Commentaries and the Privileges or Immunities of 
United States Citizens: A Modest Tribute to Professor Siegan, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 777, 782 
(2008) (noting that initially, “it was widely assumed that privileges and immunities covered 
positive law rights securing property and the right to practice a commercial trade.”); William J. 
Rich, Taking “Privileges or Immunities” Seriously: A Call to Expand the Constitutional Canon,
87 MINN. L. REV. 153, 216 (2002) (“Employment rights have been consistently linked to our 
understanding of ‘privileges or immunities.’”); see also Epstein, supra note 7, at 345 (“[T]he 
right to practice one’s occupation is . . . closely tied to entry into commerce, the pursuit of 
happiness, and the ownership of property . . . .”).
199 See Rich, supra note 198, at 216.
200 See, e.g., Camden, 465 U.S. at 233 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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of the relevant scarcities and other market conditions.201 Nor can we say in advance, 
more generally, that a restriction on hiring opportunities will more “directly” or 
“immediately” affect one party or the other.
Of specific interest for this Article’s purposes is that in any case in which the 
prospective employee is either a documented or undocumented alien, the prospective 
employer may be a citizen of the state in question or of another state as well as a citizen 
of the United States.202 For the purposes of considering the regulated employment 
transaction, we may for sheer simplicity think of an alien prospective employee and a 
citizen prospective employer. The alien may or may not have in-state residence or 
other substantial and sustained in-state ties. The citizen, in turn, may or may not have 
similar linkages.
The employer-citizen in such a case thus may be a resident of the state in question.
In that instance, the most immediately and obviously relevant privileges or immunities 
would be those that accrue under the Fourteenth Amendment, which on some sensible 
views may well now encompass more than the limited range initially recognized in 
the Slaughter-House cases.203 One might also read the Article IV Privileges and 
Immunities Clause as more than a limited, and perhaps redundant, version of an equal 
protection clause benefiting out-of-staters alone.204
If, on the other hand, the employer-citizen is a non-resident of the state in question, 
Article IV Privileges and Immunities, which clearly includes employment-related 
privileges, would certainly be available.205 Presumably, Article IV’s Commerce 
Clause-like concern for employment, callings, occupations, and the practice of hiring 
for business projects, as in Camden itself, would apply fully.206
Consider, though, the position of the alien who seeks employment from the above 
employer. If the alien were instead a citizen of the United States but not of the relevant 
                                                          
201 Studies in this area effectively capture impacts of employment restrictions in hindsight, 
however. For an example of the impacts of employment restrictions on aliens and citizens, see 
Howard F. Chang, Immigration and the Workplace: Immigration Restrictions as Employment 
Discrimination, 78 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 291 (2003).
202 Certainly, a reversal of these alienage and citizenship roles as between the prospective 
employer and prospective employee is possible as well. The alien, as entrepreneur, may be 
hiring citizens.
203 Consider the possibilities suggested in supra notes 90–114 and accompanying text.
204 Rights of out-of-staters under Article IV may or may not be protected as stringently under 
that Article as under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court, for example, applied some sort of 
hybridized strict and mid-level scrutiny in Camden under Article IV, but applied strict scrutiny 
in the right to travel equal protection case of Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), 
overruled by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). For the Camden case’s murkier language, 
see supra note 38. In general, if Article IV Privileges and Immunities count as implicitly 
constitutionally fundamental, they should evoke strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause. For example, see the strict scrutiny applied in the voting rights equal protection case of 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). We need not take any stand on these questions herein.
205 See the discussion of Camden, supra notes 26–38 and accompanying text, as well as 
McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 227 (2013).
206 See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219 (1984).
23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2018
748 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:725
state, Article IV and Fourteenth Amendment privileges would both accrue.207 If the 
alien were a citizen of the United States and of the state in question, then at a minimum, 
the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause would clearly attach.208
Alienage in this context thus does not erase the possibility of what in effect 
amounts to privileges or immunities protection for someone who lacks citizenship 
status. Whether an alien is deemed a resident of the state in question or not, the alien 
in these circumstances directly and inescapably partakes in and enjoys a privilege or 
immunity that is merely the other logically essential half of the inherently relational, 
reciprocal, and interpersonal transactional privilege held by the citizen with whom
employment is sought. The transactional rights of prospective employers and 
employees thus are inherently shared and inseparable, even if the rights of the former 
are constitutional privileges and even if the latter persons are not themselves also 
citizens.
To deny, as through traffic regulations, realistic employment opportunities to 
aliens among other persons is inescapably to deny the essentially corresponding or 
reciprocal opportunities of prospective employers who qualify as citizens and who 
thus may invoke any relevant privileges or immunities. At first approximation, the 
proper judicial outcome in these cases is just what one would expect if the court has 
formally extended the relevant privilege or immunity to the alien in question.209 This 
holds whether the actual employer is physically present on the municipally regulated 
scene or not.210 One entirely reasonable way of accounting for these observations is by 
recognizing that documented or undocumented aliens effectively hold, under 
particular circumstances, what one might at a very minimum call “pragmatic” or “de 
facto” privileges or immunities.211
A complication arises in cases where the prospective or actual employer of the 
alien is not a natural person or a corporation. In such instances, an alien non-citizen 
can hardly be said to share or draw upon the citizen status of the purely corporate 
employer, as corporations are assumed, at least for our purposes, to be non-citizens,212
and thus are incapable of holding privileges and immunities,213 at least under Article 
                                                          
207 See even the highly restrictive analysis in the Slaughter-House cases, supra notes 65–89
and accompanying text.
208 See id.
209 See Camden, 465 U.S. at 218.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 See, under Article IV, Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 86 (1809), 
overruled in part by Lousiville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497 
(1844), and Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 178 (1869), overruled in part by United States v. 
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (“[I]n no case . . . has a corporation 
been considered a citizen within the meaning of [the Article IV Privileges and Immunities 
Clause].”). See also Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 95, 98 (2014); Stewart Jay, The Curious Exclusion of Corporations from the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 79, 79 (2015).
213 See supra note 212.
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IV.214 Even in such cases, however, a member or agent of the corporation, as distinct 
from the corporation,215 may still be able to assert a relevant privilege or immunity of 
citizens to the immediate logical benefit of any transacting alien.216
V. CONCLUSION
On the basis of the logic outlined above, thinking of documented and 
undocumented aliens, under specified circumstances, as effectively holding, however 
paradoxically, typical privileges and immunities of citizens is sensible. This follows 
from a careful, but entirely common sense, understanding of the inherently relational, 
inescapably social, and essentially reciprocal nature of at least some typical privileges 
and immunities. We might draw a very loose analogy to the fact that even if we choose 
to focus on the head of a coin, the very idea of the head of a coin depends upon that 
of a tail.
This is not to deny some obvious costs to aliens of any broad constitutional de-
emphasis of equal protection and due process rights of persons in favor of an increased 
emphasis on the rights of citizens, which this Article does not endorse. Some leading 
scholars have feared such a shift in emphasis.217 While these concerns are certainly 
justified, this Article has shown that in some practically crucial respects, such concerns 
are of reduced relevance or need not come into play at all. In some crucial contexts, 
non-citizens of all sorts may reasonably invoke what amount to privileges and 
immunities of citizens. As it turns out, the clearest and most practically significant of 
these contexts involves attempts to establish one sort of employer-employee 
relationship.
                                                          
214 We here set aside the less historically litigated question of whether a corporation, of any 
sort, can itself claim any of the otherwise available privileges or immunities of citizens under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.
215 See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 542 (1839).
216 See, e.g., id. (distinguishing the rights of the corporate artificial person from the rights of 
its natural person members, who may be citizens of states for Article IV purposes).
217 For example, see the discussion of the concerns of Professors Laurence Tribe and John 
Hart Ely in Bosniak, supra note 118, at 1289.
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